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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.*
On March 30, 1962, President John F. Kennedy appointed thenDeputy Attorney General of the United States Byron R. White to
serve as the ninety-third Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
In a public statement delivered on the day of the nomination, President Kennedy had these words to say about his chosen nominee: "He
has excelled in everything he has attempted - in his academic life,
in his military service, in his career before the bar and in the federal
government - and I know that he will excel on the highest court in
the land. "1 Few among us deserve such accolades, but President
Kennedy did not exaggerate Byron White's achievements. After the
Senate's unanimous confirmation, Justice White proved himself worthy of the President's confidence. I do not write here with the detachment of a judge,- as Byron has been both a colleague and a friend
for many years. His record speaks for itself.
Byron White's life is the stuff of which legends are made. Byron
Raymond White, the son of Alpha Albert White and Maude Burger
White, grew up in a small rural Colorado town. Byron was not born
into privilege, if that term is defined by wealth and social class. He
achieved his goal of attending college by earning an academic scholarship to the University of Colorado.
At the university, Byron excelled scholastically and athletically.
He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa in his junior year, and he subsequently graduated as the valedictorian of his class. Byron was named
an All-American football player, and he managed to earn varsity
letters in basketball and baseball as well. Following graduation, Byron played professional football during the 1938-1939 season for the
Pittsburgh Pirates - the team that chose him as its first pick in the
draft. He led the National Football League in rushing that year,
becoming the first rookie to accomplish that feat. He then left professional football to study at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.

* Associate Justice,
1

Supreme Court of the United States (retired).
Statement by the President Upon Appointing Byron White to the Supreme Court,
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PAPERS 283, 283 (Mar. 30, 1962).
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The outbreak of World War II caused Byron to return home in
1939 before the completion of his studies in England. He then entered
Yale Law School, where in 1940, he received the Edgar Cullen award

for the highest grades. While excelling academically in law school,
Byron played professional football for two seasons with the Detroit
Lions, which had purchased his contract from Pittsburgh. The attack
on Pearl Harbor interrupted Byron's legal studies. Like many other
Americans jolted by the attack on our country, Byron volunteered for
service in the armed forces. He served with distinction as a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy and was awarded a Bronze
Star for his work in naval intelligence. Admiral Arleigh Burke told
me that Byron personally saved American lives during the sea battle
off Okinawa.
When the war ended, Byron returned to Yale Law School and
received his law degree magna cum laude. He clerked for Chief
Justice Fred Vinson of the United States Supreme Court for the 19461947 Term before he returned to Colorado to build a successful private
practice. Fourteen years later, Byron again answered the call of his
country by moving his wife and his two children to Washington to
serve as Deputy Attorney General of the United States. He remained
in that post until he took his seat on the Supreme Court in April of
1962.

Byron and I served together on the Court for fifteen years. Byron
willingly discussed pending cases with other Justices, including drafts
of opinions, and I welcomed hearing his views. He and I shared a
nonideological and pragmatic approach to legal problems that perhaps
arose from our respective years of private practice. I came to admire
his intellect and to respect his judgment.
It was interesting to watch Byron at oral argument. If he did not
like a lawyer's argument, he often would swivel his chair around and
would appear to lose interest in the argument. His recollection of
detail, however, always made clear that he had been attentive, as he
would remember specifics that other Justices had overlooked.
Byron and I are personal friends. When the Court was sitting,
Byron usually had lunch in his Chambers that he had brought from
home or that his messenger had bought for him in the Court's cafeteria. Occasionally, he and I would leave the Court for lunch on
Saturdays. One of his favorite restaurants is - I think its name is
Duke Zeibert's - just off of Connecticut Avenue. This restaurant
caters primarily to famous athletes and politicians, many of whom
Byron knows on a first name basis.
His wife Marion and my wife Jo are also friends. We take special
pleasure in visiting the Whites as they are gracious hosts. The Whites
have a son and a daughter, both of whom are also good athletes.
Indeed, his daughter Nancy made the United States Olympic Team
that was scheduled to go to the Soviet Union in 1980. Unhappily for
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her, this was the year that the United States boycotted the Olympic
games.
Byron will be missed on the Court. He plans to follow my example
by sitting on courts of appeals from time to time. I always will think
of what President Kennedy said about Byron when he was nominated
to sit on the Court.

Rhesa H. Barksdale*
"The New Frontier" beckoned in January 1961 when John F.
Kennedy became President, with Byron R. White as his Deputy Attorney General. Justice White's recent departure from the Supreme
Court ends over thirty-two years of continuous service to our country,
and marks, in a very real sense, the end of the Kennedy era. He was
the last high-level Kennedy appointee in active service, the "Last of
the Mohicans."
The Kennedy administration is said to have brought "the best and
the brightest" to Washington. None was better, nor brighter, than
Byron White. He left the Court as he has always lived and served
- quietly, thoughtfully, with dignity, and with our nation's best
interests at heart.
Even before he arrived in Washington in 1961, Byron White's
accomplishments were well known nationally. Their breadth and
depth are truly amazing - scholar, athlete, naval officer, law clerk
to a Chief Justice, and lawyer. Space permits only the highlights to
be noted; other achievements are great in number and equally impressive. Byron Raymond White was born on June 8, 1917, in Fort
Collins, Colorado, and raised in the nearby town of Wellington. He
graduated first in his high school class and, as a result, received a
scholarship to the University of Colorado, from which he graduated
in 1938, again first in his class. He lettered in three sports at Colorado; and his senior year, as a triple-threat tailback, he led the nation
in rushing and scoring, led his undefeated team to the Cotton Bowl,
was named All America, and finished second for the Heisman. His
collegiate football fame as "Whizzer White" is reflected in the following
poem, perhaps written by the legendary Grantland Rice. I read it in
a program for a college football game played a few years ago. It went
something like this;
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, since April 1990; law clerk
to Justice White, October 1972 Term.

4

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

(Vol.

I07!I

How good is Colorado, pal,
We hear the home crowd call,
How good is Colorado,
When Whizzer has the ball?
Justice White was elected in 1954 to the National Football Hall of
Fame.
Selected as a Rhodes Scholar, but highly sought by the Pittsburgh
Pirates (now the Steelers) to play professional football, he played for
them in 1938 with the highest guaranteed salary up to then ($r5,ooo)
and led the league in rushing. He then began study at Oxford, where
he made the acquaintance of John F. Kennedy, son of the Ambassador
to the Court of St. James.
The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 terminated
Justice White's study as a Rhodes Scholar. Justice White then entered
Yale Law School, but still managed to play for the Detroit Lions in
1940 (again leading the league in rushing) and r941, before beginning
voluntary service in the United States Navy. During the war, he
served in the Pacific as an intelligence officer with PT boats, destroyers, and aircraft carriers, and concluded his service in January r946.
During that service, he again came in contact with John F. Kennedy
when he wrote the after-action report on the sinking of Kennedy's
PT ro9.
In r946, Justice White married Marion Lloyd Stearns of Denver,
Colorado. That same year, he graduated from Yale Law School, and,
while completing his studies at Yale, began his clerkship for Chief
Justice Fred M. Vinson. (The Chief Justice's inscription on the photograph he gave to law clerk White was prescient: his future would
be as brilliant as his past.) Upon completing his clerkship in r947,
he returned to Denver, Colorado, where he practiced law until r96r. 1
Having played important state and national roles during the r960
presidential campaign, Byron White was offered a variety of positions
in the new administration, but chose to serve with Robert Kennedy,
knowing that the President's brother would be the lightning rod for
the administration. Justice White is given great credit for putting
together the highly respected Kennedy Justice Department, which he
essentially managed on a day-to-day basis for over a year full of
momentous events. At the dawn of the civil rights era, he headed up
the federal task force sent into a tense Birmingham in May r96r,
commandeering mail trucks to transport the United States Marshals
around the city.

1 For a detailed and interesting review of Justice White's life through 1962, which includes
extensive comments by him, see Alfred Wright, A Modest All-America Who Sits 011 the Highest
Bench, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. IO, 1962, at 85.
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At the end of March 1962, when President Kennedy decided to
nominate him as Associate Justice, Byron White was attending a
meeting in Colorado. When the President telephoned to tell Justice
White his decision, Justice White responded that the President was
"putting him out to pasture mighty early." Following an almost immediate and extremely brief confirmation hearing (estimated at fifteen
minutes), he was confirmed by the Senate on April II, and took his
oaths of office and seat on April 16, 1962. Almost forty-five years of
age when he began, he served until the Court recessed on June 28,
1993, twenty days after his seventy-sixth birthday. (Justice White will
continue to serve by sitting occasionally with federal courts of appeal.
He was the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit for many years, and
we hope greatly that we will be graced by his presence - soon and
often.)
It was my great fortune to serve as one of Justice White's law
clerks during his eleventh year on the Court. That privilege, and my
contact with him from time to time over the past twenty years, have
given me insight that I am honored to share. Moreover, my service
on the federal bench perhaps provides me with additional appreciation
for his qualities as a judge. The lasting impression from working for
Justice White was such that, although seventeen years elapsed between ending service to him and beginning service as a judge, my
first day in the latter seemed only one day removed from the former.
(That feeling was also experienced by another of his former clerks
who became a federal judge.) My chambers, for the most part, are
patterned after his; it is my hope that my clerks have some modicum
of the feeling of collegiality, mutual respect, professionalism, and team
effort that Justice White engendered in his chambers.
In working with his clerks, Justice White was a true believer in
the adage that two heads are better than one. He invited participation, oral or written, on any matter, and his door was always open
for suggestions and discussion. He would raise and discuss an issue
wherever we were and whatever we were doing, quite often at lunch
or on one of the not-infrequent "field trips" on which he would take
us, to such places as the Library of Congress or an art museum, or
by simply walking back to our office to visit and have a cup of coffee
(he had reserved seating). Obviously, he did not always agree with
his clerks' views, but they always received a full and fair hearing.
On the other hand, he never wanted a clerk to work on an issue if
she or he was uncomfortable doing so; he joked that "there are just
some things you don't even ask a hired gun to do."
The great love and respect that Justice White's clerks have for
him is demonstrated by the fact that eighty-three of the ninety-four
attended a dinner in Washington last June to commemorate his retirement, even though the annual reunion of his clerks had been held
earlier in the year in Denver. He and Mrs. White have always taken
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a personal and continuing interest in his clerks, so that there is a true
feeling of family and continuity. Accompanied by Mrs. White, he has
sworn in four former clerks as federal judges (Fifth, Eighth, Tenth
and Federal Circuits).
A very private person, Justice White respects the privacy and
feelings of others. At the same time, he is a person of immense
warmth and kindness. He is friendly, personable, and possesses a
dry, quick wit. My earliest memory of the latter was in the summer
of 1972, before the Term began, when he had lunch with his clerks
and included a friend of ours from another chambers. One of the hot
issues at the time (at least to the clerks) was whether a public school
could control the length of a student's hair. The clerk from the other
chambers asked if the Justice had an opinion on that issue; Justice
White replied quickly that indeed he did. The clerk awaited further
response; receiving none, he asked: "What is your opinion?" Justice
White smiled and replied: "Everyone is entitled to one."
The preceding example reflects Justice White's good humor and
cheer. More importantly, it is consistent with his proper refusal ever
to discuss an issue that might come before the Court. This policy is
but one of many examples of the way in which he exemplifies the
best qualities in a judge. Another is his careful avoidance of even the
slightest, most remote, possible appearance of impropriety. Yet another is his active participation at oral argument, where his insightful,
penetrating questions are designed to bring the real issues into sharp
focus, to try to find answers to questions prompted by the briefs. As
he has said, he does not view oral argument as a means of giving due
process to counsel, but as a means of trying better to understand the
case.
Well grounded in legal history and principles, thoughtful and extremely careful with every word in his opinions, Justice White does
not go beyond the issue at hand. Not doctrinal, he has not pursued
a personal agenda. Instead, he has dealt with the issues as they have
arisen, and has kept them - and the resulting holdings and judgments
- as narrow as possible, so that there could be reasoned, and reasonable, predictability to the law for the American people, in order
that the law could properly develop in a careful, studied way, consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis. He always considers not only
how an issue springs from the past and should be applied in the
present, but also what effect it might have in the future. His opinions
reflect his unwavering confidence and faith in our majoritarian, democratic system. He understands the limited role of the courts, especially the federal courts, in that system, feeling confident that the
affairs of our nation are best managed by its people and their elected
representatives. 2
2

For a classic, and well known, example of these views, see his dissent to Roe v. Wade,
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Byron White's selfless, unrelenting service to our country as a
Justice spanned eight administrations. He sat with twenty Justices,
including three Chief Justices. He got along with all of them; he made
it a point to. And, whatever their backgrounds or legal persuasion,
they liked him. He was never personal in his opinions, and was
always gracious and thoughtful in his dealings with each member of
the Court.
Perhaps the word "solid" best describes Byron White. His life is
one of solid achievement; a life marked by excellence. Indeed, he
personified the pursuit of excellence long before that phrase came into
vogue. He has never sought the limelight. He has served in order to
serve. Including the current Court, rn7 Justices have served; Justice
White's service of thirty-one years, two months and twelve days is
the ninth longest. (His tenure is narrowly eclipsed by that of Justice
John McLean, who served only eleven days longer (January n, 1830April 4, 1861). The parallels in their tenure are most interesting; both
were forty-four when they took the bench, and seventy-six when they
left it. Happily, the parallels end there - death was the reason for
Justice McLean's departure; Justice White is in good health.) In this
century, Justice White's tenure is exceeded by that of only three
Justices: William 0. Douglas (thirty-six years and almost seven
months), Hugo L. Black (thirty-four years and one month), and William J. Brennan, Jr. (two months shy of thirty-four years). Justice
White served for nine or more years with each of them.
Because he is in good health, Justice White easily could have
established a record for tenure on the Court. He probably could have
served another ten years at least. But in this, as in all things, it is
not his way to seek personal recognition. Records, for records' sake,
mean nothing to him. Believing that new blood should come to the
Court, he stepped aside.
Byron Raymond White is a national treasure, one of the greatest
sons our nation has produced. Great persons come seldom; seldom,
if ever, will the Court, or this nation, see his likes again. The national
issues and mood have changed constantly, but he has been constant,
steadily crewing our Ship of State. Truly, he was, remains, and
always will be, the best and the brightest.
GODSPEED.

410 U.S. n3 (1973), which appeared in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
221-23 {1973) (White, J., dissenting).
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David M. Ebel*
My first impression of Justice Byron R. White was of his massive
hands. I had just walked into his office to be interviewed as a
prospective law clerk. As he approached me, I was not particularly
struck by his size. However, when he grabbed my hand, I immediately sensed the solidness, the strength, and the directness that have
defined Justice White throughout the nearly thirty years that I have
known him.
He quickly settled down to business in the interview. He asked
what I thought about some of the cases decided by the Supreme Court
during the previous Term and about one or two issues currently
pending before the Court. He addressed me in a matter-of-fact tone
with no effort to cross-examine my responses. The atmosphere was
pleasant yet businesslike. At some point in the interview, however,
he found out that my wife's maiden name was Nordby and that she
came from Minneapolis. Immediately, the tone of the interview
changed as he was reminded of Judge Gunnar Nordbye, a federal
district judge in Minnesota. The Justice proceeded to speak about
Judge Nordbye with a warmth and personal interest that was quite
different in character from the preceding part of the interview. His
interest in the personal lives of his friends and acquaintances has
proved to be an enduring quality.
His clerkship offer came several weeks later by phone. The entire
conversation went something like this: "Hello, David, this is Byron
White. If you're still interested, I'd be happy to have you clerk with
me when you graduate." I immediately accepted, and he then closed
by saying, "Good. You can expect a confirming letter from me in the
next several days. Good luck during the rest of your time at Michigan." That was the extent of the call. Direct and to the point. Again,
vintage BRW (BRW are the Justice's initials, and that was the manner
in which we addressed written communications to him).
On my first day at work, my co-clerk and I had lunch with the
Justice in the public lunchroom in the basement of the Supreme Court
building. Somehow, the conversation turned to atomic physics, a
subject in which I had a layman's interest. As I was discussing a
theory, I suddenly felt myself being pulled, without warning, into a
vortex of questions from the Justice from which there appeared to be
no escape. The questions came with a rapidity and an incisiveness
for which I was totally unprepared. Each question seemed to identify
a weakness in my theory or a gap in my knowledge. Once my plight
became as apparent to him as it was to me, the questions stopped as
suddenly as they had begun. This progression from incisiveness to
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; law clerk to Justice White,
October 1965 Term.
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vigorous questioning and, ultimately, to mercy was one that I saw
repeated over and over again on subjects as diverse as art, philosophy,
history, politics, sports, and of course, legal issues.
This same approach was often reflected in the Justice's questioning
from the bench. Although his questions were penetrating, he never
asked them just to score debating points or to embarrass counsel. If
Justice White had already figured out the answer, he saw no point in
making counsel squirm under his questioning. It is as instinctive for
Justice White to respect the dignity of others as it is for him to expect
that others will respect his dignity.
A strong focus on the task at hand marked life in Justice White's
chambers. The average work schedule consisted of ten- to twelvehour days plus a "light" Saturday, which typically concluded with a
late lunch with the "boss" at a local restaurant. In addition, we
usually took briefcases full of work home at night. The Justice maintained the same long hours, but what was most remarkable about his
work habits was the intensity of his work. He seemed to be researching, writing, thinking, and analyzing all at the same time. There was
a decidedly physical aspect to his thought processes as he approached
each case with the same energy that he had previously reserved for
opposing linebackers while playing football for the University of Colorado and in the National Football League.
The Justice's typical routine before oral argument was to call my
co-clerk and me into his office to discuss the cases that would be
argued the next day and to ask for our input. It would have taken
a dense clerk not to have figured out within the first week of the
clerkship that any thoughts we expressed had better have substance
behind them. The Justice wanted data, precedent, concrete arguments, legislative history, facts from the record, and the like, rather
than our unsupported judgment. If we had something to add, he
would listen. As soon as we ran out of useful information, however,
the conversation on that case would end. He had an uncanny ability
to know when that moment arrived, and it would have been foolhardy
to attempt to extend the discussion beyond our resources. The only
effective way to deal with ignorance was forthright admission. Such
an admission never drew criticism or a lecture. It simply constituted
an acknowledgment that it was time to move on to something else.
The stakes went up considerably when it came to preparing the
first draft of an opinion. The Justice would often do his own first
draft on an old manual typewriter. His powerful fingers were nimble,
and he could, without any discernible typing technique, turn out a
page with remarkable speed. Sometimes, however, the Justice would
invite us to prepare a first draft in accordance with his reasoning and
logic. Such an offer came with a string attached. He would announce
that, in his spare time, he might also be working on a first draft of
the same opinion. We knew that if he completed his draft first, we
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would all work with his draft, and our draft would become only a
research memo. Although this practice may have had its origin in
the Justice's competitive nature, I think it was just as likely an expression of his impatience, his economy, and his oft-repeated belief
that in writing opinions two heads are better than one.
Whatever the logic behind this practice, the effect on his law clerks
was pronounced. We would invoke the benign, if somewhat conspiratorial, assistance of his secretary, Jane Pike, to keep us advised of
the progress the Justice was making on a particular opinion upon
which we also were working. We willingly worked into the early
morning hours to get our draft to the Justice before he completed his
own version. We won some of those races, and we lost some. Of
course, victory only meant that our horse got out of the starting gate.
The Justice's editing sometimes left us with only a bare paragraph or
two that could someday be shown to our grandchildren as the product
of our work.
The intensive work schedule was occasionally relieved by a late
afternoon basketball game or paddle tennis match. The Justice would
come in and ask, "What do you say if we go up and shoot a few
baskets?" The invitation sounded so innocuous, even innocent. We
would retire to the basketball court on the top floor of the Supreme
Court building, which was appropriately known as "the highest court
in the land." (When Justice White was himself a law clerk to Chief
Justice Vinson, he once created so much noise on that same court
playing a competitive game of badminton that the Justices had to
send up a note asking him to stop during oral argument.)
If it were just the Justice and his two law clerks, he would typically
start with a game of "Horse." The Justice had an accurate one-handed
set shot and a pretty fair hook shot, as well as a collection of idiosyncratic shots like his over-the-back free throw. The intensity would
pick up when we moved to a two-on-one scrimmage with the Justice.
However, his competitive side was more prominently displayed on
those occasions when law clerks from some of the other chambers
joined us in a game. On those days, elbows and bodies would be
flying every which way. Typically, the elbows belonged to the Justice
and the bodies belonged to the rest of us. We never experienced any
actual broken bones, although I understand that subsequent clerks
were not always so fortunate.
Sometimes, on a Saturday afternoon after work, we would walk
to the National Gallery of Art with the Justice. En route the Justice
would discuss some of the art that we would be seeing and the reasons
why he liked or disliked it. On our first visit, as we walked into the
initial room of the gallery, the Justice pointed out one of the pictures
that he had discussed on the walk. I went over to examine it more
carefully, but when I looked up, the Justice was nowhere to be seen.
I hurried to catch up with him several rooms later where, once again,
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he pointed out something in a picture that had caught his attention.
I approached that picture to examine more carefully what the Justice
had observed, and when I looked up, once again I was alone. The
pace picked up after that. In each room, the Justice would make a
comment or observation about one or more of the pictures. However,
once the remarks were made, that was it. The Justice offered neither
elaboration nor processing time for us to integrate his comments.
This is illustrative of a general characteristic of the Justice that I
have observed over the years. He simply does not need much processing time to absorb and integrate information. A brief statement
travels fully clothed into his consciousness with all of the trappings
of nuance, comparison, structure, and context that, for most of us,
require articulated analysis and, even more importantly, time. For
most people, some repetition is useful because it provides time to
process the information. For Justice White, repetition and elaboration
are often a waste of time. I am convinced that this characteristic
contributes to the common misperception of Justice White as brusque
or abrupt.
Notwithstanding all that has been written about the Justice's competitive spirit, he also has a nurturing and affectionate side. The
Justice has had approximately one hundred law clerks over his thirtyone years on the Court, and he keeps up with nearly all of them.
Mrs. White takes top honors in that department, however, as she also
keeps track of the children and even the grandchildren of the former
clerks. The Justice frequently invites his present and former clerks
to join him and Mrs. White on skiing trips back in Colorado, and it
is not uncommon to see him leading a dozen or more of them down
a Colorado mountainside, sometimes against their better judgment. I
have also been fly-fishing with the Justice, and I know many of his
clerks have joined him on similar adventures long after their clerkships
were over. When several of his former clerks suffered serious illness,
they invariably received calls or visits from the Justice. Four of his
clerks have now become Court of Appeals judges, and upon each
investiture the Justice was there to preside over the occasion with
parental pride.
The Justice's affection for, and personal interest in, others goes
well beyond his law clerks. During the winter of the year I clerked,
there was a terrific snowstorm in Washington, D.C. My co-clerk and
I had managed to get to work after quite a struggle, but the Justice
was not there. By late morning, we began to worry that he might be
stuck on the highway, and we eventually tracked him down. In fact,
what he had been doing was going from house to house to see if his
neighbors needed help with their cars or other assistance.
One day, the son of one of Justice White's old football buddies
walked into chambers unannounced. Apparently, his father had been
confident that Justice White would welcome him, and that confidence
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was well placed. The Justice dropped everything and gave that young
man a forty-five-minute tour of the Court. Another time we heard
the sounds of gruff affection coming from his office. It turned out
that an older woman had walked into chambers and was visiting with
him. We later learned that she was a retired employee from the
University of Colorado whom the Justice had known during his college
years. She felt she could simply walk into the Justice's chambers to
visit him whenever she was in Washington, and he obviously concurred in that judgment.
I remember another group of unannounced visitors that generated
a different response from the Justice. One afternoon we had taken a
brief break from work to engage the Justice in a putting competition.
This game required all of us, including the Justice, to stand in the
clerks' room and to putt a golf ball from there, across the secretary's
area, and into the Justice's office through a series of connecting doors.
The object was to cause the golf ball to stop as close as possible to a
particular leg of one of his side chairs. This task was made more
complicated because of the placement of furniture and because of
deceptive wear lines in the carpet that frequently altered the ball's
course.
On this occasion, the Justice was holding the putter, which was
dwarfed by his hands just like everything else that fell within their
grasp. He was standing over the ball near the front entrance when
the door opened and in peeked several nuns on a tour of the Court.
They all stood transfixed, Supreme Court Justice and nuns in full
habit, staring at each other for a long, awkward moment. The Justice
blinked first; then he retreated to his office, leaving it up to us to
assist the nuns and to explain what was going on. This experience
produced an expression on the Justice's face that I had not seen before
or since - an expression of sheepishness.
During the year I spent clerking for him, I came to realize that
the Justice had been strongly influenced by his roots, particularly in
his pragmatic approach to the law. He is a product of Wellington,
Colorado, a small farming community in north central Colorado, just
south of the Wyoming border. There the winters are harsh, the spring
winds strong, and the summers often hot. He worked in the sugar
beet fields as a youth, and his early experiences revolved around hard
work, sports, fishing, and practical people engaged in agriculture and
small business. So, although his extraordinary intellect has allowed
him easily to appreciate the subtle nuances and philosophical implications of the issues before him, at the core he is guided by common
sense and practical judgment.
Let me close by recounting one last event that occurred just about
one year ago when the Justice was in Denver. We walked into a
jewelry and Indian artifact store that was a landmark even in the
days when Justice White was a young lawyer in Denver. The Justice
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took an obvious interest in the owner, who was now well into her
seventies or beyond. He inquired not only about her and the long
tradition of her store, but also about the history, techniques, and
detail of much of the artwork and many of the artifacts. When she
asked who he was, he declined to tell her. (He did, however, point
to me and explain that I was a federal judge.) At that point, she had
taken some expensive jewelry out of a locked cabinet for the Justice
to examine, and she briefly went into the back room, leaving us alone
with the jewelry. When she returned, the Justice said that she should
not leave valuable jewelry in front of strangers because they might
steal it. She responded, matter-of-factly, that if he had run out of the
store with the jewelry, she would have raced after him and grabbed
him. (She could not have weighed more than ninety pounds, even
throwing in a couple of pounds for self-confidence.) The Justice asserted that he could have outrun her. She disputed that, and pretty
soon I was watching a good-natured debate about which of them was
faster.
As I stood there watching this improbable encounter, I once again
witnessed the Justice's interest in people, his inquisitive nature, and,
of course, his competitive instincts. I had observed these characteristics so many times before. Some things never change.

Lance Liebman 'f
Of ro7 Justices in 205 years, only twelve have served longer than
thirty years, and every long-serving Justice has made a substantial
contribution to the institution - offering a steady and dedicated
response to the judicial challenges of an era, asserting leadership at a
time of national crisis, or articulating a large constitutional vision.
The personal qualities and life experiences that a new Justice brings
to the Court contain the seeds of the individual's judicial service.
Justice White, a skeptical but unflinching democrat, was no exception.
I served as a law clerk to Justice White during the r967 Term.
Former law clerks can be perfect celebrants of a retired judge, 1 but

* Dean and Lucy G. Moses Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law; clerk to
Justice White, 1967 Term.
I Clerking in any court, and especially in the Supreme Court, is an ideal transitional role
from promising law student to responsible adult. Every law clerk needs to be told once (for
most of us only once) that she or he was not confirmed by the Senate. Then the clerk accepts
full responsibility for the correct votes and the clever lines, while taking a "who, me?" attitude
toward the clunkers. Never again to achieve such a perfect combination of elite dignity and
freedom from responsibility, the law clerk nearly always looks with reverence at the judge whose
most brilliant decision was to select this particular clerk.
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they may be less reliable as analysts of his judicial contribution. The
year of intimate observation and personal contact may create an emotional lens that distorts clear perception of the published jurisprudence. In my case, I followed and felt that I understood Justice
White's opinions for perhaps five years after I was his clerk. Later,
particularly after Watergate, the social context had changed so much
that I no longer felt that I had special purchase on his relationship to
the law. Reading now the published results of this judicial career,
my sense is that Justice White's approach to the job changed very
little through the three decades of his service. From beginning to
end, he saw the appropriate limits of the position more clearly than
its dramatic possibilities. He knew well that particular historical
contingencies had placed him on the Court and that the institution
was far bigger than he. His job, as he saw it, was to decide cases:
to read the briefs, to question the lawyers rigorously, to find the flaws
in general statements about the law, and to see, as far as humanly
possible, the consequences of each decision and its supporting rationale. Thus his powerful intelligence was largely focused on predicting,
skeptically, the consequences of conclusion and reason - the consequences for other applications of a rule, and the real-world consequences of a Supreme Court decision. Perhaps no one who has ever
sat on the Court has been more consistently aware that he was one
participant in a large system for governing 250 million people, and
that others - in Congress, in the executive branch, in state and local
governments, on school boards, in police departments, and in important positions in the private sector - must act and decide as well.
Byron White was a member of the confident and initially optimistic
generation that served in World War II and embarked on professional
careers immediately after the war. Having succeeded as scholar and
athlete, and having made the American opportunity system work for
him, he practiced law in growing Denver before he played a major
role in the victorious political campaign of John F. Kennedy, his
acquaintance from England and the Pacific. 2 Justice White and President Kennedy, from such different backgrounds, shared the antiideological, pragmatic values of their generation. Justice White's service in the executive branch as Deputy Attorney General was strenuous and basically successful as the new administration sought a
responsible path through the early (and easier) stages of the civil rights
revolution.

2 I suspect he would find it a perfect example of the American system of opportunity and
diversity that a Justice who grew up in the foothills of the Rockies and fought in World War
II has been succeeded by a Justice from Brooklyn who played a major role in the struggle for
gender equality that has been such a large part of the past quarter century.
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During Justice White's thirty-one years on the Court, the American
system of government met turbulent times. The President who appointed him was assassinated. Robert F. Kennedy, his superior at the
Department of Justice and close collaborator, was killed in r968, very
possibly on his way to the White House. 3 It became clear that the
nation's racial divisions would not be easily bridged. Richard Nixon,
whom Justice White entered politics to oppose, became President.
Watergate challenged the basic structures of the political system. The
Brethren4 threatened, if not the Supreme Court, at least the terms of
Justice-clerk trust that were especially meaningful to Justice White,
the first former law clerk to become a Justice.
From his first Term to his last, Justice White was skeptical. He
doubted that a code of police conduct, declared by the Supreme Court,
would assure the constitutional rights of defendants without unacceptable costs to law enforcement. 5 He refused to assent to the Court's
"exercise of raw judicial power" to give priority to "a spectrum of
possible impacts on the mother" over "the continued existence and
development of the fetus. "6 He doubted that the country would be
better off if disputes over state aid to religious schools, so potentially
destabilizing to a society, were taken out of the political process. 7
On the other hand, his skepticism sometimes led him to challenge
conventionalities that were no longer defensible. He was readier than
many of his colleagues to find no rational basis in a legislative enactment;8 clear about the availability - in limited circumstances to be
3 I sat in Justice White's chambers on the day after Senator Robert Kennedy was shot. The
Justice had to cope first with a news report of irreparable brain damage and then with the
announcement that the Senator had died. This was also the term of Martin Luther King's
murder, of the Poor People's March on Washington, of the Washington riots, and of the first
large protests outside the Supreme Court building.
4 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). The authors claim to
have interviewed more than 170 former law clerks and to have had from one to four sources
within the chambers of each Justice for every Supreme Court Term from 1969 to 1975. See id.
at 3-4. When I was a clerk (albeit pre-Watergate), it was unimaginable that any law clerk
would talk to a reporter about matters discussed in chambers or in conference. I have little
doubt that, after The Brethren, relations between Justices and clerks in many chambers became
less open, at least for a period of time.
s See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 541-44 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
6 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) ("This issue, for the most
part, should be left with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to
govern their affairs."). Although it appeared in Doe v. Bolton, Justice White's dissenting opinion
applied as well to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. II3 (1973).
1 See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1984) (White, J., dissenting); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1979); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 819-24 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
8 See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that
distinctions in the definition of household were "irrational" and violated the Equal Protection
Clause when used to determine food stamp benefits); Attorney Gen. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S.
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sure
of substantive due process review; 9 unafraid to reconsider
First Amendment dogma in light of the vast powers of the modern
press;IO willing to overturn the traditional structure of American
school finance; 11 and doubtful about congressional justifications for
excluding women from the draft.12

898, 916 (1986) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the civil service employment

preference granted to veterans who are New York residents should be invalidated under rational
basis review); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985)
(holding that the application of a zoning ordinance to a group home for the mentally retarded
was based on "an irrational prejudice" and failed rationality review under the Equal Protection
Clause).
9 See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 542-44 (White, J., dissenting).
Characteristically, his clearest statement was a quotation:
[The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause] is not a
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreason·
able searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints
Id. at 542-43 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting) (citations
omitted)). Having accepted such open-ended authority in the Supreme Court, Justice White
explained the restraint with which that authority should be exercised:
That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights should
not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the
Constitution. . . . [T]he Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further
substantive content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted
by a State or city to promote its welfare. Whenever the Judiciary does so, it unavoidably
pre-empts for itself another part of the governance of the country without express constitutional authority.
Id. at 544.
This is the best description of the reasoning behind Justice White's votes in Mira11da, Roe
v. Wade, and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). He also discussed the subject acutely
in his dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986), in which he criticized the substantive protection afforded to abortion in Roe v. Wade
and argued that Roe v. Wade should be overruled, see id. at 786--97 (White, J., dissenting).
IO See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 402 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) ("The
case against razing state libel laws is compelling ... in light of the increasingly prominent role
of mass media in our society and the awesome power it has placed in the hands of a select
few."); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263 (1974) (White, J., concurring)
("[l]t is a near absurdity . . . to leave the people at the complete mercy of the press . • . when
the press . . . is steadily becoming more powerful . . . . ").
11 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4II U.S. 1, 63-70 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a Texas school-financing scheme based on local property tax revenues
failed rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause due to its discriminatory impact
on poor school districts). Had Rodriguez, a 5-4 decision, been decided as Justice White advocated, it would have resulted in federal court-supervised structural change with a level of
disruption and controversy similar to that brought on by reapportionment and school desegregation.
12 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83-86 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
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Justice White was a democrat, committed to a healthy political
process13 and ready to allow that process to work. 14 Endlessly questioning, Justice White looked for data and expertise 15 and encouraged
executive and administrative agencies to take responsibility for important public choices. 16 He was also flexible, ready to allow new
government structures to meet new conditions. This was clearest in

13

See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,

470 U.S. 480, 509 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (refusing to "second-guess" the legislative

judgment that "large-scale expenditures" threaten the electoral process); Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 308 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) ("Recognition that
enormous contributions from a few institutional sources can overshadow the efforts of individuals
may have discouraged participation ... and undermined public confidence in the referendum
process."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264-66 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("It is critical to
. . . dispel the impression . . .. that federal offices are bought and sold . . . . ").
14 An interesting exception, which I have tried and failed to explain, is affirmative action.
See Lance Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 471, passim
(1987). He was first receptive and then hostile to politically developed solutions. Compare
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480-92 (1980) (upholding, in an opinion joined by Justice
White, racial and ethnic criteria for a minority set-aside program with remedial goals) and
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (holding, in an opinion joined by Justice
White, that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not disallow certain voluntary private
sector affirmative action plans to eliminate racial imbalance in traditionally segregated jobs) and
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 368-69 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall,
& Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that a state university
may adopt race-conscious admissions criteria to combat effects of past discrimination) with
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) {stating that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a public school board from laying
off white workers who would not otherwise be laid off in an effort to keep blacks on the job).
Yet Justice White's approach to other areas of the Constitution suggested a readiness to let
employers and government find their way through the challenges of a diversifying society.' My
suspicion is that his commitment to the legitimacy of merit-based devices for rewarding effort
led him to reject the use of affirmative action.
It is interesting that, in his penultimate opinion, Justice White distinguished the arguments
for affirmative action in creation of election districts from the arguments for affirmative action
in employment that, in recent years, he rejected. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, II3 S. Ct. 2816,
2842-43 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) ("State efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly
unlike ... 'affirmati_ve action.' ... [R]emedying a Voting Rights Act violation does not involve
preferential treatment. It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment . . . . " (citations
omitted)). From his days in the Justice Department and his first days on the Court, Justice
White saw that effective African-American participation in the political process is the country's
best route to social progress and racial peace.
15 See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. II96, 1210, 1215-16 {1991) (White,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Whereas Justice Blackmun was ideologically committed and adamant in striking gender-specific employment limits, Justice White
was unconvinced by the data that supposedly showed fetal risk. He was ready to consider
future evidence, properly evaluated by experts, that would justify employment limits adopted
to protect fetal health.
l6 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 {1983).
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his dissents from the Court's decisions in the 1980s that struck down
new procedural devices for carrying on the business of government.17
A Supreme Court Justice has three tasks. The first is to assist in
the orderly functioning of an immensely complicated system of government. To do this, a Justice must live by the highest ethical standards, address every case with a clear head, and be as honest as
possible in giving reasons and identifying the connections between
cases. In the history of the Court, no one has performed this role
better, longer than Justice White. He has done so with an immensely
sophisticated awareness of the structure of our public life and with a
deep commitment to progressive evolution of the institutional forms
of our federalist democracy. He has also demonstrated an absolutely
extraordinary capacity, from age forty-four to age seventy-five, to take
up a case as a problem, to analyze it in great detail, to see deeper
into it than most, and to give his judgment and justifications. This
is the core of the daily task we assign to our Supreme Court Justices.
Second, a Supreme Court Justice sits in readiness to respond to
crises. At certain points in the nation's history, the system of government comes under attack or is in urgent need of reform. Individual
rights must be affirmed. They are likely to be unpopular rights, hence
the failure of our democratic institutions to respond to them. This is
the role the Supreme Court played in Brown v. Board of Education,18
17 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act budget procedures are not unconstitutional); Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-68, 1002 (1983) (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the one-house legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act is
not unconstitutional); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
n5-18 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the jurisdiction granted to Article I bankruptcy
judges by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 is not unconstitutional). In Bowsher, Justice White
criticized the majority's "distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers as a bar to the
attainment of governmental objectives through the means chosen by the Congress and the
President in the legislative process established by the Constitution." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759
(White, J., dissenting). In Chadha, he wrote:
We should not find the lack of a specific constitutional authorization for the legislative
veto surprising . . . . From the summer of 1787 to the present the Government of the
United States has become an endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the
Framers. . . . But the wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate that the Nation would
gIOw and new problems of governance would require different solutions.
Clzadlza, 462 U.S. at 978 (White, J., dissenting). The eighteenth-century constitutional text, for
Justice White, was often not the answer to contemporary questions but the source of information
about the values that the Supreme Court is required to interpret. His method was succinctly
defined in his N ortlzern Pipeline dissent:
I do not suggest that the Court should simply look to the strength of the legislative
interest and ask itself if that interest is more compelling than the values furthered by
Art. III. The inquiry should, rather, focus equally on those Art. III values and ask
whether and to what extent the legislative scheme accommodates them or, conversely,
substantially undermines them. The burden on Art. III values should then be measured
against the values Congress hopes to serve through the use of Art. I courts.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at II5 (White, J., dissenting).
18 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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in its reapportionment cases, 19 in the Pentagon Papers Case, 20 and in
Watergate. 2 1 I slept well knowing that Justice White was on the
bench. I knew he breathed the deep values of the American experiment - opportunity, equality, diversity - and that when we needed
him, he would be there. 22
Third, a Supreme Court Justice articulates constitutional visions.
These visions help us understand what the Court is doing and how
we should think about our laws and our system of government. To
articulate constitutional visions, a Justice must commit generalizations. But generalizations simplify and limit. As written, they are
usually wrong. Visions, even constitutional ones, are also fuzzy and
egotistical. For the past three decades, the Court has given the academy as many generalizations as we have needed, but Justice White
delivered fewer than his share. Rather, Justice White decided cases.
He understood deeply the defects of general statements. He thus gave
us very few incorrect generalizations, though perhaps not enough
helpful ones. Fortunately, he served alongside twenty-one Justices,
hardly any his match in intellect, none his master in devotion to the
job, but many readier than he to opine generally.
Justice White did his part as the Supreme Court kept American
democracy on a tolerably even keel through thirty-one remarkable
years. Not a simplifier, a generalizer, or a turner of cheap phrases,
Justice White contributed the toughest questions, the sharpest distinctions, and the purest honesty. He contributed in these ways because
he knew himself and his country, needed no honors or rewards beyond
those he earned in full, and saw perfectly the role that history had
handed to him. Byron White was an American23 Justice - molded
by his life experiences and guided by his pragmatic skepticism and
deep democratic beliefs. He has set a magnificent example for those
who will follow.

19 See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482-85 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 566 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208, 229, 237 (1962).
20 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97, 704-07 (1974).
22 The exception is Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which is, for me, his least
convincing opinion. (Every Justice seems to have a worst decision. For the revered Justice
Harlan, it was Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).)
23 He would not want me to write "an All-American Justice," and so I won't, at least not
in the text. More than once during my year as his clerk, the Justice's secretary, Jane Pike, was
asked on the phone, "How does he spell Whi2zer?" She always answered, "B-Y-R-0-N."
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Charles Fried*
Over his career, Justice White has annoyed quite a few people. 1
It is hard to escape the sense that the sharpest annoyance stems from
a simple dissatisfaction with his position on one .of the most contentious issues ever to arise before the Court: abortion. His dissent in
Roe v. Wade 2 was strong stuff and must have earned him many
enemies among those for whom this issue transcends the more abstract
questions of craft and doctrine. And that enmity can only have
deepened when he recalled some of the harshest aspects of that dissent
in his majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick. 3 Surely, this hostility
also includes some sense of betrayal: John F. Kennedy appointed
Justice White, and so he was supposed to owe allegiance to what are
identified as liberal causes (not only did he dissent in Roe, but he
joined the dissent in Miranda). 4 Or perhaps it was just the result of
expectations raised by a position in one case, then dashed in the next,
as when, after joining without comment Justice O'Connor's controlling
opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,5 which subjected to
strict, and thus fatal, scrutiny a city's racial set-aside, 6 the next Term
he joined without comment Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,7
an opinion that was clearly, even provocatively, inconsistent with
Croson. 8
* Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank
Michael Shen of the Harvard Law School class of 1994 for his research assistance.
I See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Next Justice: How Not to Replace Byron White, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 12, 1993, at 21 ("White, in short, cannot be ranked among the most successful
justices; and his various shortcomings - philosophical, collegial, temperamental and jurisprudential - reveal the very specific skills that effective justices must possess."); see also Joan
Biskupic, Clinton's Chance for Change: Choice Could Ease Conservative Grip on Court, WASH.
POST, Mar. 20, 1993, at Ax, A13 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School).
2 410 U.S. n3 (1973). Justice White's dissent actually appeared in Roe's companion case
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See id. at 221-23 (White, J., dissenting).
3 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Compare Doe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting) ("As an exercise
of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but in my
view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review
that the Constitution extends to this Court.") with Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 ("The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.") a11d Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) ("The Judiciary,
including this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even
the design of the Constitution.").
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 526
(White, J., dissenting)
5 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
6 See id. at 495, 511.
7 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
s Many of Justice White's detractors emphasize his many apparent inconsistencies. See, e.g.,
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Justice White was indeed hard to predict in race cases. 9 In Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 10 he joined with Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in a partial dissent that would
have given very free constitutional rein to affirmative action schemes
that favored African-Americans. 11 In United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber, 12 he joined Justice Brennan's majority opinion that had the
same effect under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 13 Yet five years
later, in Fire.fighters Local Union No. I784 v. Stotts, 14 he wrote an
opinion of indefinite sweep, condemning race-conscious affirmative
action remedies that benefited individuals who were not identified
victims of Title VII violations. 15 In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 16 and United States v. Paradise,17 he seemed to hold to
the latter position in delphic dissents. 18
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 19 he joined the Court in instituting
a very broad effects test for employment discrimination under Title
VII. 20 Yet in Washington v. Davis, 21 he wrote to reject that test as
a measure of constitutional right. 22 In his dissent in City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 23 he appeared to be returning to Griggs in arguing that
effect might be a sufficient proxy for intent. 24 Continuing this favorable disposition toward effects tests, in Thornburg v. Gingles 25 he
joined the Court's opinion that made electoral success a principal

Rosen, supra note 1, at 25. But see Lance Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58
U. COLO. L. REv. 471, 472 (1987) {"This is an occasion for honoring Justice Byron White....
There is no 'White theory' of the law or the Constitution. Rather, there are 25 years of majority
opinions, cryptic concurrences, angry dissents, and provocative dissents from denials of certiorari.").
9 Cf. Liebman, supra note 8, at 473-87 {attempting to reconcile Justice White's opinions on
race and affirmative action).
to 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11 See id. at 362 {Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
12 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
13 See id. at 200-08.
14 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
15 See id. at 578-83.
16 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
11 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
ts See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 499-500 {White, J., dissenting); Paradise, 480 U.S.
at 196 (White, J., dissenting).
19 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
20 See id. at 432.
21

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
22 See id. at 239.
23 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
24 See id. at 102-03 {White, J., dissenting). In fact, in Bolden, Justice White argued that,

under the standard adopted by the Court in Washington v. Davis, effects can be substantial
evidence of intent. See id.
25

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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criterion of fair access to the political process under the newly
amended Voting Rights Act. 26 Yet in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 27 he wrote an opinion that many thought largely undid Griggs.
There were other stunning reversals of ground. Having written
the Court's opinion in Swain v. Alabama,28 he joined in overruling it
in Batson v. Kentucky, 29 which subjected peremptory challenges to
intent test scrutiny for racial motives. 30 Having written the opinion
of the Court in McNally v. United States,3 1 which seemed to limit
the use of federal mail fraud convictions to cases that looked like
standard thievery,32 the very next Term, in Carpenter v. United
States,3 3 he once more permitted a quite expansive use of that federal
prosecutorial tool. 34
All in all, these seeming inconsistencies were a sign of strength
and integrity. They showed that Justice White was not out to please
or to garner the accolades - newspaper editorials, law review symposia, testimonial dinners - that are the only currency with which
interested parties may without impropriety suborn the judiciary. In
Justice White's case, this disposition is a sign not only of good character - a character unconcerned with flattery - but also of a good
judge. It is not possible to have seen Justice White in the courtroom,
to have argued before him, without getting a sense of a strong intelligence. He knew the case. He had worked out its intricacies - he
obviously loves a puzzle. He delighted in asking just the question
that displayed a weakness the advocate was trying to skate over, or
perhaps had not even noticed. "Skewer" is the word that comes to
mind. So if there was inconsistency in his positions over the years, it
could not have been from inattention or a lack of intellectual power.
My guess is that he came closer than most Justices to trying to make
sense out of each case, one at a time. 35 Doctrinal consistency just did
not weigh very heavily with him if it led to a conclusion that did not
make sense. With no other Justice would you get so little mileage
26
27

35, 77.
U.S. 642 (1989).
U.S. 202 (1965).
U.S. 79 (1986).
id. at 89-98.
U.S. 350 (1987).
See id. at 352, 356, 360.
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
See id. at 27-28.

See id. at

490
2s 380
29 476
JO See
JI 483
32
33

34

Some scholars, however, have criticized him for this approach:
White's trademark . . . is a lawyerly case-by-case analysis. "Justice White has almost
from the beginning been a person who didn't develop doctrines or frameworks or ways
of looking at things that would influence other justices" .... "As a result, he has been
among the least influential. If he is replaced by anyone with a more systematic approach,
that could over time be more influential of other justices."
Biskupic, supra note 1, at A13 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School).
JS
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from quoting his own words back to him. 3 6 Another virtue of this
disposition was Justice White's willingness to go along to "make a
Court" - a subordination of personal punctilio to the goal of making
the Court's work useful to, not to say usable by, the lower courts and
the profession. 37
But that is not all there was. Although he did not wear his
theoretical commitments on his sleeve - in part because they were
often more intuitive than explicit - there was more than a thread of
continuity in Justice White's work. Contrast him to Justice Felix
Frankfurter, whose theoretical commitments, although very explicit,
perhaps did not fully account for his conclusions after all.
There was one place where Justice White's commitments were
right on the surface, and he explained them with rigor, passion, and
strength: separation of powers. It was only with Buckley v. Valeo3 8
that the Burger Court began to revive a muscular constitutional separation of powers jurisprudence. This development gathered steam
36 Compare McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352, 356, 360 (1987) (White, J.) (holding
that, in a case in which government officials had defrauded the public through a "self-dealing
patronage scheme," § 1341 of the federal mail fraud statute is "limited in scope to the protection
of property rights" and does not protect "the intangible right of the citizenry to good government")
with Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987) (White, J.) (holding that confidential,
pre-publication information of a newspaper is "property" protected by § 1341).
Another example is Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), a case in which Justice White
joined the majority. In Morrison, the Court stated that the powers to investigate and prosecute
are "not inherently 'Executive'; indeed, they are directly analogous to functions that federal
judges perform in other contexts." Id. at 681. Earlier, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam), however, the Court appeared to have argued that investigatory power was a core
executive function: "A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the
President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'" Id. at 138 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3). In
a separate opinion in Buckley, Justice White appeared to echo the sentiments of the Court when
he wrote: "I would be much more concerned if Congress purported to usurp the functions of
law enforcement . . . . " Id. at 285 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
Morris on, the Court made its decision fully aware of its previous statements, as the appellees,
in arguing that prosecution was solely an executive function, cited Buckley in their briefs, see,
e.g., Brief for Appellees Schmults and Dinkins at 9, Morrison (No. 87-1279); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at ro, Morrison (No. 87-1279), and during
oral argument, see, e.g., Oral Argument of Solicitor General Fried as Amicus Curiae, Supporting
Appellees at 57-58, Morrison (No. 87-1279).
37 On his last day on the bench, Justice White stated:
Since I remain a federal judge and will likely sit on Courts of Appeals from time to time,
it will be necessary for me to follow the [Supreme] Court's work. No longer will I be
able to agree with or dissent from a court opinion. . . . Hence, like any other Court of
Appeals judge, I hope the Court's mandates will be clear, crisp, and leave those of us
below with as little room as possible for disagreement about their meaning.
Tony Mauro, Wrapping Up for the Summer with a Wrap-Up for White, RECORDER, July 7,
1993, at 8. But see Justice White's concurrence in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 294-95 (1986) (White, J., concurring in the judgment), for an opinion that is short in
length, reasoning, and guidance to the lower courts.
38 424 U.S. l (1976).
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in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 39 which explicitly or implicitly invalidated hundreds of congressional statutes and
a device - the legislative veto - that had been a fixture of the
political landscape since the 1930s. 40 It received perhaps its strongest
statement in Bowsher v. Synar,41 the Gramm-Rudman case. There
were dissents in all these cases, and the doctrine was badly punctured
in Morrison v. Olson42 (the Independent Counsel case) and Mistretta
v. United States43 (the Sentencing Guidelines case), but none of the
Justices who took up the cudgels against a more rigorous separation
of powers did so with Justice White's coherence and single-mindedness.
There is a vision and a theory behind his separation of powers
opinions. In their power and coherence, they are rivalled only by
Justice Scalia's polar opposite view. Justice White's conception is
distinctly parliamentary. The Constitution establishes the Congress as
the engine of government. The legislative veto, Gramm-Rudman
hammer, and legislative representation in the Federal Election Commission, which the Court struck down in Buckley, White thought
valid because congressional action in canonical form instituted them.
Not only are the substantive ends of congressional action, set out in
Article I, Section 8, enlarged by that provision's Necessary and Proper
Clause, but Congress's institutional enactments elaborating governmental structures are also to be judged by that expansive and permissive standard. It is not so much the political science of Justice
White's defense of the legislative veto that is magisterial, but the
underlying vision of Congress as fully enabled to devise not just new
schemes of government, but new schemes of governing. Justice White
made the pragmatic case for the legislative veto when he argued the
peculiar aptness of that device to allow Congress to set the broad
outlines of policy and yet, at the same time, to maintain some authority over the details of its administration. 44
The welfare-administrative state, with its comprehensive reach and
enormous complexity, threatens the eighteenth-century scheme of gov462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See id. at 967-74 (White, J., dissenting).
41 478 U.S. 714 (1986). In Bowsher, the Court held that, impeachment proceedings excepted,
Congress cannot reserve for itself the powers of removal of an officer charged with the execution
of the laws. See id. at 421-34.
42 487 U.S. 654 (1988). In Morrison, the Court upheld federal provisions restricting executive
branch power to appoint and remove "independent counsel" under the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978. See id. at 670-96.
43 488 U.S. 361 (1989). In Mistretta, the Court upheld the Sentence Reform Act of 1984,
which created an independent commission - whose membership included federal judges - to
establish sentencing guidelines. See id. at 380-404.
44 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-74 (1983) (White,
J., dissenting).
39

40
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ernmental powers with impotence or incoherence. Although Justice
Scalia chose the Presidency, Justice White would have made Congress
the organ of coherence, with the legislative veto the means for Congress to impose it. In the muddle created by its most recent pronouncements - Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 45
Morrison, and Mistretta, which collectively allowed a proliferation of
power centers responsible neither to Congress nor to the President the Court opted for incoherence. As it did, less comprehensively, in
striking down the devices in Chadha, Bowsher, Buckley, and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Inc. 46 It was not the wisdom of the devices, however, that moved Justice White; rather it was the sense that Congress
had the authority to achieve that coherence in any way that seemed
reasonable to it - any way that was "necessary and proper."
That is why his vision seems, above all, parliamentary. And in
that respect we may see Justice White as the descendant of a long
line of progressive thinkers, going back at least to Woodrow Wilson,
who saw Congress as the American counterpart of the House of
Commons, and thus as the repository of the people's sovereignty. That
vision explains why Justice White would have no patience at all with
the Court's analogous ventures into defining structural limits on Congress's authority over the states. To him, National League of Cities
v. Usery,47 New York v. United States, 48 and even the interpretive
principles of Gregory v. Ashcroft49 must be anachronistic impediments
45 478 U.S. 833 (1986). In Schor, the Court held that the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's assumption of jurisdiction over common-law counterclaims did not "impermissibly
threaten the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch." / d. at 851.
46 III S. Ct. 2298 (1991). At issue in this case was a statute that transferred control over
two major airports from the Federal Government to the Metropolitan Washington Airport
Authority (MWAA). This transfer was conditioned on the creation of a "Board of Review,"
composed of nine congressmen, which would have veto power over the MWAA decisions. See
id. at 2301. The Court held that this condition violated the principle of separation of powers.
See id. Justice White, however, argued that the Court's decision misapplied principles both of
separation of powers and of federalism. See id. at 2312 (White, J., dissenting). Not only was
the statute a legitimate enactment of Congress, see id. at 2320, but also the entire separationof-powers argument did not apply to this case, because the Board of Review was a "creatureD
of state law," id. at 2313.
47 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that, although the Commerce Clause gives Congress the
authority to enact legislation regulating disposal of radioactive waste, such legislation must be
directed at individuals; Congress cannot compel state legislatures to enact and enforce these
regulations).
48 II2 s. Ct. 2408 (1992).
49 1 II S. Ct. 2395 (1991). In Gregory, the Court applied a "plain statement rule" in determining whether Congress intended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to apply
to state judges. See id. at 2401. But see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985), in which Justice White joined the majority holding that Congress must express its
intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself,
see id. at 242-43, and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in which Justice
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to rational government of the same order as Chadha, Bowsher, and
Buckley.
This parliamentary conception of Congress may also explain his
distaste for the Court's interference, in the name of the Establishment
Clause, with legislative solutions to awkward problems of social policy. 50 Also, the notion of Congress as the seat of popular sovereignty
might explain Justice White's seemingly inconsistent positions in Metro
Broadcasting and J.A. Croson (Congress could mandate racial setasides, but the City of Richmond could not) and why Congress in the
Voting Rights Act of 1982 could restructure the political landscape (as
it could in the Federal Election Act, every part of which Justice White
thought constitutional), but the courts, though acting directly under
the Constitution, could not. 51
If I have put my finger on Justice White's guiding doctrinal compass, perhaps this explains as well his overall style and temperament.
This allegiance to Congress might be seen as a larger sympathy for
popular judgment in general, or rather an antipathy to fancy arguments of all sorts. This antipathy may never have been expressed
more clearly than in the opinions for which Justice White may well
most be remembered. Whatever else may be said about them, the
arguments in Roe, from which Justice White dissented so vehemently,
and the dissents from his opinion in Bowers, were certainly quite
fancy.5 2
White dissented and argued for a strict application of Atascadero's interpretive standard, see
id. at 45 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In both these
cases, Justice White apparently opposed the stance he later took in Gregory. In his dissent in
Gregory, to dispel the apparent contradiction, Justice White distinguished the issues of Atascadero, see Gregory, III S. Ct. at 2409 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment), but did not mention Union Gas.
so See, for example, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985), and School Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), in which the Court held that publicly funded programs for religiously
affiliated private schools violated the Establishment Clause. Justice White consolidated his
dissents in both cases into one opinion, writing, "I have long disagreed with the Court's
interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause in the context of state aid to private
schools." Ball, 473 U.S. at 400 (White, J., dissenting).
51 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. II2, 229-31 (1970) (Brennan, White, & Marshall,
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
s2 I doubt Professor Parker would agree, but it may be that Justice While comes closest on
the Supreme Court to the style Parker celebrates in "Here the People Rule": A Co11stit11tio11al
Pop11list Manifesto, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 531 (1993).

